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COMMENTARIES

Influenza A(H1N1) and Pandemic Preparedness
Under the Rule of International Law
Lawrence O. Gostin, JD

A

NOVEL STRAIN OF INFLUENZA A(H1N1) SPREAD RAP-

idly through Mexico in April 2009 and now spans
the globe. By the time the World Health Orga nization (WHO) was notified and had responded,
geographical containment was not feasible, leading the agency
to call for mitigation.1 Early indications are that the first wave
may not be as widespread or pathogenic as originally feared,
but this influenza strain could evolve to become more dangerous in subsequent waves, as did the 1918 Spanish influenza that killed some 50 million individuals.
The international outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and the more recent influenza
A(H5N1) among birds with limited transmission to humans helped prepare the world for the current pandemic
threat. SARS galvanized WHO to revise the antiquated International Health Regulations2 in 2005, which took effect
June 15, 2007.3 Governments instituted preparedness plans
in response to avian influenza.4
Despite increased preparedness, WHO and the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) lack key powers and resources. Reminiscent of past responses, many governments are acting out of fear or economic and political
self-interest rather than out of scientific reason. Above all,
there are serious questions of global justice, as Mexicans have
become subject to stigma and discrimination.
WHO Pandemic Alert System
On April 29, WHO raised the pandemic alert level to 5, the second highest level. The World Health Assembly revised the
pandemic alert level system in 2009, but that action has been
ineffective because it does not trigger agency powers, and countries are not required to take any action. The alert system is
based on geographic distribution of sustained spread among
humans without due regard to the actual health threat because
it could entail relatively mild disease. The threat level, moreover, could heighten fears and cause the public to overreact.
International Health Regulations
The revised International Health Regulations for the first time
in history permits an organized global response within the rule
of international law, and H1N1 offers the first test of its effectiveness. The International Health Regulations’ purpose is “to
2376 JAMA, June 10, 2009—Vol 301, No. 22 (Reprinted)

prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health
response to the international spread of disease,” while balancing the values of human rights and free trade (Article 2).2
Emergency Declaration. On April 25, 2009, the WHO
director-general convened an emergency committee and declared a “public health emergency of international concern,”5
marking the first time a declaration had been made under the
new regulations, which define a public health emergency as
an extraordinary event that constitutes a public health risk to
other states through the international spread of disease, potentially requiring a coordinated international response.
Notification. In the early, crucial weeks of the SARS outbreak in 2003, China did not openly and promptly report the
first SARS cases. Consequently, the International Health Regulations now require states to notify WHO of all events within
their territories that may constitute a public health emergency. The WHO director-general, not the state, has the ultimate authority to determine whether an event is of international concern. More specifically, states must report any
case involving a new subtype of human influenza. WHO has
authority to bypass official state reporting and require countries to verify unofficial data sources and can harness new information technologies such as the Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network. The mandate to report and use additional data sources strengthens WHO’s ability to track, analyze, and respond to emerging infectious diseases.
WHO Recommendations. A declaration triggers the director-general’s power to issue temporary recommendations. The director-general may also issue standing recommendations on routine, periodic application of health
measures for specific, ongoing public health risks. On the
same day the director-general made her declaration, she recommended that “all countries should intensify surveillance for unusual outbreaks of influenza-like illness and severe pneumonia.”5 The director-general did not recommend
travel or trade restrictions, screenings, or examinations.
Human Rights. The International Health Regulations require states to treat travelers with respect for their dignity,
human rights, and fundamental freedoms. Although the regulations allow countries to impose personal restrictions beyond those recommended by WHO, these may be no more
Author Affiliation: O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Georgetown
University, Washington, DC.
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restrictive, invasive, or intrusive than reasonably available
and effective alternatives. Generally, states cannot require
invasive medical examinations, vaccinations, or other prophylaxis as a condition of entry for travelers or require health
documents beyond those permitted under the International Health Regulations.
International Trade. The International Health Regulations, consistent with World Trade Organization rules, require trade restrictions to be based on scientific evidence
and risk assessments. Trade measures must be no more restrictive of international commercial traffic than reasonably available and effective alternatives.
Gaps in WHO Powers and Resources
The International Health Regulations, therefore, empower
WHO to provide leadership on public health measures. Yet
there remain significant gaps in the agency’s authority and
resources necessary for an effective global response.
Monitoring and Enforcement. Widespread failure to comply with international norms was a key reason for the new
International Health Regulations. Yet the regulations afford WHO little authority to monitor and enforce rules. Although most countries conscientiously reported H1N1, WHO
has no authority to penalize for a failure to notify. More importantly, the International Health Regulations impose binding limits on travel and trade restrictions, but many countries have flagrantly violated this norm with impunity. The
WHO director-general has power to make recommendations, but the International Health Regulations explicitly state
that those new recommendations are nonbinding.
Capacity Building. Perhaps the most important norm in
the International Health Regulations is the requirement for
countries to build capacities for surveillance and response.
Yet low- and middle-income countries lack adequate public health infrastructures. Although the regulations encourage rich states to donate resources and technical assistance, precious little has been devoted to build capacity in
poor countries. This places the world at significant risk because emerging infectious diseases often originate in highly
populous countries in Africa and Asia with close interchange between humans and animals.
Virus Sharing. WHO has been embroiled in a major controversy with Indonesia for 2 years over its refusal to share
influenza A(H5N1) virus samples that are critically needed
to assess the threat of novel strains of influenza. Indonesia,
supported by many low-income countries, argues that it
would not be guaranteed affordable and sufficient access to
vaccines. The International Health Regulations do not afford WHO authority to resolve disputes like these, despite
its importance to global security.
Gaps in CDC Powers and Resources
Most individuals believe that highly developed countries such
as the United States have all the power and resources they need.
Yet, the CDC and state and local health departments lack both.
©2009 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.

Although all other major countries with federal systems signed
the International Health Regulations without reservation, the
United States gave notice that it might not comply with the regulations under principles of federalism if a public health power
belonged to the states rather than to the federal government.
The Canadian SARS Commission criticized the lack of legal power and resources available to public health agencies.6
This resulted in fundamental reform of public health law and
an influx of resources. The United States, however, has not
learned those lessons. The CDC’s legal authority to prevent
the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable
diseases into or within the United States dates back to 1944,
but its critical powers—to quarantine, inspect, disinfect, and
destroy animals—have limited applicability to a few diseases. If the CDC tried to exercise power, its legal authority
would be challenged, causing needless delays and uncertainty, and its actions might be ruled unconstitutional. To its
credit, the CDC has tried for more than a decade to modernize its legal authority. But even though its proposed fundamental revision was submitted more than 3 years ago, regulations have yet to be finalized.7
Federal and state legislatures have also allocated inadequate resources to the CDC and state and local health departments. As the cost of health care has soared, only about
2.5% of total health spending has been allocated to prevention and public health.8 A few states have strong surveillance systems, but many others are deficient so that early
warning and response are highly fragmented.
Global Justice
Despite the International Health Regulations norm that travel
and trade must be scientifically well founded and respectful
of human rights and commerce, countries have implemented numerous restrictions. Mexico has sustained severe
economic and social repercussions as tourism and trade have
sharply decreased; its gross national product declined 0.3%
to 0.5% in a matter of weeks.9 The media refers to H1N1 as
the “Mexican” flu. Mexicans have been inappropriately blamed
and called unclean, and conservative US commentators have
urged tougher penalties against Mexican immigrants.10
Quarantine and Thermal Scanning. Asian countries previously affected by SARS have been most aggressive in response to H1N1, although all regions have adopted coercive
measures.11 China and Hong Kong implemented quarantines for travelers from Mexico, Canada, and the United States.12
Furthermore, 22 Canadian university students with no apparent flu symptoms were held in a hotel in Changchun, a city
in northeastern China.12 In Hong Kong, an infected man from
an AeroMexico flight was isolated, while 300 guests and employees at the hotel where he stayed were confined for a week
under police guard.13 In Singapore, anyone who recently visited Mexico was placed into home quarantine. Additionally,
thermal scanners were set up at airports and hospital isolation units in China and Singapore, where staff at emergency
departments wore full protective clothing.11
(Reprinted) JAMA, June 10, 2009—Vol 301, No. 22
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Social Distancing. Social distancing measures have been
widely adopted, including closure of schools, public events,
and mass transportation. The CDC recommended school closures for up to 14 days if a case of H1N1 influenza was suspected or confirmed. Before the CDC reversed its position only
4 days later, more than 700 schools were closed, affecting some
245 000 children.14
Travel Restrictions. WHOsuggestedtravelrestrictionswould
have “very little effect on stopping the virus from spreading,
but would be highly disruptive to the travel community.”15 Despite this, many countries, including the United States, have
advised against all nonessential travel to Mexico. Some countrieshaveimplementedoutrighttravelbans.Forexample,China
suspended all flights between the 2 countries and chartered a
plane to pick up Chinese nationals within Mexico. Additionally, Latin American countries (Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, and
Cuba) suspended flights from Mexico. Countries such as Japan and Singapore have singled out Mexicans for special visa
requirements such as requiring a medical examination or only
accepting mail applications to avoid physical contact.
Trade Restrictions and Culling. There is no scientific evidence that eating pork causes influenza. Yet 20 countries
have banned meat from Mexico, Canada, and the United
States, including 2 of the world’s largest pork importers,
China and Russia. In response, Mexico filed a statement with
the World Trade Organization arguing that such bans violate international trade rules. Egypt took the drastic measure of culling the country’s estimated 400 000 pigs, perhaps motivated by prejudice against the Coptic Christian
minority (the primary consumers of pork).
Epidemics often bring out irrational fears and discriminatory behaviors among individuals and governments. It is all the

moreimportant,therefore,tohaveaninternationalsystemguided
by science that has adequate funding for research and public
health and that conforms to the rule of international law.
Financial Disclosures: None reported.
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New Guidelines for the Management
of HIV-Related Opportunistic Infections
Henry Masur, MD
Jonathan E. Kaplan, MD

T

HE YEAR 2009 MARKS THE 21ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE
first meeting to draft an AIDS management guideline for prophylaxis against Pneumocystis carinii
pneumonia in persons with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection.1 In 1988, knowledge about HIV/
AIDS was rapidly increasing, but relevant publications were
appearing in a wide array of journals that clinicians could
not easily track, and practitioners articulated a need to have
a concise, reliable summary of “best practices.”
The initial guidelines were developed by a group of experts from the major AIDS care centers in the United States,
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who reviewed the literature, debated the issues in a 2-day meeting, provided evidence-based recommendations, and promptly
published their guidelines.1 Subsequently, these guidelines
were broadened to include prevention and treatment of other
opportunistic infections in HIV-infected adults and children.2-8 As clinicians and publishers became more comfortable using Web-based resources, these guidelines were posted
on the Web with links from Web sites sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, and the Infectious Diseases Society of America
Author Affiliations: National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland (Dr Masur); and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia (Dr Kaplan).
Corresponding Author: Henry Masur, MD, National Institutes of Health Clinical
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